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I.

Introduction: The Aging Revolution

III.

When lawyers outside the United States think of (and write about) new developments in private international law in the United States, they usually think of the
choice-of-law revolution with its new theories and new approaches. They think of
Walter Wheeler Cook’s local law theory with its counter-intuitive idea that judges,
when they proclaim to apply foreign law, in reality create local law specifically
catered to the case with its interstate or international implications.1 They think of
the full-blown attack on traditional private international law by Brainerd Currie’s
interest analysis, which asks for the court to explicitly address the policies underlying specific substantive law rules from different legal systems and the question of
how to deal with potential true conflicts among those rules.2 They think of David
Cavers’s attack on what he called system-selecting choice-of-law rules and his
preference for rule-selecting approaches that do not designate the applicable
contract law in general but instead determine the applicable law rule by rule, even
∗
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issue by issue.3 They think of William Baxter’s idea of comparative impairment,4
of Ehrenzweig’s lex fori theory,5 of Leflar’s ‘better law theory,’6 and of von
Mehren’s and Donald Trautman’s functionalism.7
In other words, the new developments they think of are old news. The U.S.
conflicts revolution has aged, and it has not aged well. The foundations for the
revolution were formulated in the 1920s and 1930s; the most important theoretical
texts and judicial decisions stem from the 1950s and 1960s. The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws dates from 1971 and is thus older than the vast majority
of conflicts codifications worldwide. The most famous case – Babcock v. Jackson,8
which overcame the strict territoriality principle for the law of torts – is almost 50
years old. Its holding, the application of the law of the parties’ common domicile to
liability for an accident suffered elsewhere, is now, from a comparative law perspective, unexciting.9 Tellingly, in his authoritative recent book on the past,
present, and future of the revolution, Symeon Symeonides confines the chapter on
‘the scholastic revolution’10 to ‘the writings of the most influential members of the
revolution’s first generation, all but three of whom are now deceased.’11
Even more discomfiting, however, is Prof. Symeonides’ subsequent list of
‘[t]he next generation, the present. ‘, [...]a diverse and prolific group that includes
revolutionaries, counter-revolutionaries, and reformers,’ because most of the articles for which he cites this group were written decades ago, too. Even if a number
of more recent publications, by these and other authors, could be added,12 the
3
D. CAVERS, The Choice-of-Law Process (1965); id., The Choice of Law: Selected
Essays 1933-1983 (1985).
4
W. F. BAXTER, ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’, in: 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1963).
5
A. A. EHRENZWEIG, ‘The Lex Fori -Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws’, in: 58
Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960).
6
R. B. LEFLAR, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law’, in: 41 NYU
L. Rev. 367 (1966); id., ‘More on Choice Influencing Considerations’, in: 54 Cal. L. Rev.
1584 (1966).
7
A. T. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, The Law of Multistate Problems (1965).
8
191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); republished, e.g., in H. SCHACK, Höchstrichterliche
Rechtsprechung zum Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht (2d ed. 2000) case no. 21,
p. 89, where all other published decisions (except for two other non-German decisions) are
more recent.
9
K. SIEHR, ‘Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law’, in: 60 La. L. Rev. 1353
(2000).
10
S. C. SYMEONIDES, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and
Future (2006) 9-35. The book is a revised version of S. C. SYMEONIDES, The American
Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and Tomorrow, 298 Rec. des cours 1
(2003).
11
Id. at 9, n. 5.
12
For recent bibliographies, see S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Conflict of Laws Bibliography:
U.S. Sources, 2005-2006’, in: 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 789 (2006); id., ‘Private International Law
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general gist seems clear: some fifty years after the revolution, the intellectual
excitement that once defined U.S. scholarship has largely petered out.13 One gets
the feeling that the revolution has run out of steam; it is merely being administered.
At the same time, the opposition to the revolution has lost interest, apparently
unable to present viable alternatives.
A similar picture emerges from case law. Symeonides’ annual surveys of
conflict-of-laws decisions in U.S. courts, published in the American Journal of
Comparative Law,14 have long ceased to report big methodological developments,
largely because there are none. This would not be a reason for despair if courts’
decisions still provided valuable insights, or at least some continuity could be
discovered, but neither really is the case. What we observe could be called,
euphemistically, pragmatism in the solution of conflict-of-laws problems: all
available methods can be used to justify all desirable (and undesirable) outcomes,
so the best approach is to downplay the importance of method altogether and
instead resolve cases on the basis of what seems right. Less euphemistically, this
could be called muddling through – making necessary decisions without a clear
theoretical framework of why they should come out this way rather than another.
It is remarkable how much the crisis of conflict of laws is a particularly USAmerican, or perhaps North American,15 matter. Elsewhere in the world, conflict of
laws is thriving. Europe is perhaps the most obvious example. Some scholars have
suggested that the difference is due to the European preference for evolution, a
slow, gradual development of conflicts thinking, over revolution.16 Others, less
generously, think that Europeans are still caught in naïve faith in the power of
formal doctrine. By contrast, I have argued that these developments amount to a
veritable choice-of-law revolution, European style.17 Developments in Europe, both
legislative and in the case law of the Court of Justice, replace the traditional
conflict of laws paradigm with one based on the federalization and
Bibliography 2007-08: U.S. and Foreign Sources in English’, in: 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 331346 (2009).
13
K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES, ‘Foreword: Transdisciplinary Conflicts of
Law’, in: K. KNOP et al. (note *) 1, 3.
14
Most recently S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009:
Twenty-Third Annual Survey’, in: 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 227 (2010) with references for earlier
reports. These reports are also available at <http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/journals/wlo/
conflicts>.
15
For Canada, see the references in K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES (note 13) 2-3.
16
E.g. J. VON HEIN, ‘Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New?
Rome II and the European Choice-of-Law Evolution’, in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1663 (2008); D.
SOLOMON, ‘The Private International Law of Contracts in Europe: Advances and Retreats’,
in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1709 (2008); S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘The American Revolution and the
European Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons’, in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1741-91
(2008).
17
R. MICHAELS, ‘Die europäische IPR-Revolution: Regulierung, Europäisierung,
Mediatisierung’, in: Festschrift J. Kropholler (2008), 151-173; English version as ‘The New
European Choice-of-Law Revolution’, in: 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1607-1644 (2008).
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constitutionalization of private international law, and by a plurality of methods:
different methods apply to conflicts between laws of the member states and
conflicts with the law of third countries; classical conflict of laws and new regulatory conflict of laws methods stand in productive conflict with each other.
In some ways, the European revolution is in even more radical than the
American one, because it has achieved goals that the U.S. revolution missed,
notably the federalization and constitutionalization of choice of law.18 The U.S.
revolution, by contrast, led to a dead end, perhaps because it did not go far enough
in two aspects central to early realist critiques: politics and theory. The revolution
discarded old doctrinal instruments of conflicts – characterization, renvoi,
preliminary questions – as mere formalism, fig leaves concealing the politics at
stake, the social goals aimed at. A new theory of law emphasized law’s relation to
social ends. The plea to formalize these social goals was incorporated in
governmental interest analysis, which essentially views every law as the embodiment of some governmental policy. But in application, governmental interests
were depoliticized and detheorized: To be manageable, these interests had to be
stripped of their political and social content and treated as mere preferences, data.19
The antiformalism of the revolution spurred a method that spawned a new
formalism.
Is there a chance for a revival? There has been talk, most recently at a big
conference at New York University in the spring of 2009, of a new Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, to replace the Restatement Second, which is forty years old and
has been controversial from the start.20 At present, support for such a project does
not seem great. The main counterargument against such a Restatement – that the
field is in such disarray that there is nothing to restate – seems overstated: debates
over a new Restatement might very well spur the necessary broader discussions, as
did discussions over earlier Restatements. The big problem is not virulent
disagreement but rather uniform disenchantment: the inability in the field to even
discuss issues of politics and theory makes it hard to see how the necessary
excitement could be spurred that would be needed for such a broader discussion.
There is little hope for such excitement in the core of the discipline – especially choice of law for tort and contract – because, it seems, everything that could
be said (and more) has already been said; ‘everything worthy of trying has been

18

Ibid. at 1643.
Cf. A. RILES, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the
Technicalities’, in: 53 Buff. L. Rev. 973 (2005), 1018-21.
20
‘Symposium: The Silver Anniversary of the Second Conflicts Restatement’, in: 56
Maryland L. Rev. 1193 (1997); ‘Symposium: Preparing for the Next Century – A New
Restatement of Conflicts’, in: 75 Indiana L. J. 399-686 (2000); S.C. SYMEONIDES, ‘A New
Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?’, in: 5 J. Pr. Int. L. 383-424 (2009); see also M.
TRAYNOR, ‘The First Restatements and the Vision of the American Law Institute, Then and
Now’, in: 32 So. Ill. U. L. J. 145 (2007).
19
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tried before, under the same or other labels.’21 However, not all is lost. There are in
fact exciting developments in conflict of laws, but they are taking place at the
fringes and not in the center. Politics is an issue for the most hotly debated topic in
conflict of laws at the moment, same-sex marriage, and many scholars of marriage
law or gender studies have become interested in conflict of laws. Theory is an issue
for interdisciplinary interest in conflict of laws from the perspective of other disciplines – economics, political science, anthropology. What some of the participants
in these debates lack in specific conflict of laws expertise, they make up for by
bringing new perspectives into an intradisciplinary debate that has long been
chasing its own tail. In the next two sections I discuss these developments in turn,
and analyze what they could mean for a broader revival of U.S. conflict of laws,
before addressing, briefly, the implications for a new Restatement.

II.

The Return of Politics: Same-Sex Marriage

The focus of the choice-of-law revolution and of most debates on method had been
on contract and torts. Both of these areas have consolidated – contracts especially
through the acceptance of party autonomy, tort law through what may be loosely
described as a presumption for lex loci with an exception for common domicile
cases. The most important developments today happen outside the law of obligations, first among them the question of same-sex marriage.
Same-sex marriage is currently one of the most disputed political topics
generally, and the country remains deeply divided over the issue. The first state to
legalize same-sex marriage was Massachusetts, where a 2003 court decision
declared the ban on same-sex marriage to be a violation of the state constitution.22
Since 2008, developments have accelerated tremendously. On the one hand, courts
in California,23 Connecticut24 and Iowa25 have rendered decisions under their own
states’ constitutions by and large similar to the one in Massachusetts. Legislators in
Vermont,26 Maine27 and New Hampshire28 and the District of Columbia29 took
21

K. H. NADELMANN, ‘Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts
Law’, in: 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 860 (Autumn 1963), cited in F. K. JUENGER, Choice of
Law and Multistate Justice 6 (1993).
22
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
2003).
23
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2008).
24
Kerrigan v. Commr. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 2008).
25
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, (Sup. Ct. Iowa 2009).
26
15 Vermont Statutes Annotated § 8, as amended by 2009 Vermont Laws No. 3 (S.
115).
27
An Act To End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom,
2009 Maine Legislative Service Ch. 82 (S.P. 384) (L.D. 1020). The Act explicitly also
granted recognition to same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere.
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similar steps through the legislative process. On the other hand, opposition against
these movements is strong. Referenda have overturned the decisions in California30
and in Maine;31 the New York State and New Jersey Senates have each rejected
proposals to legalize same-sex marriage in domestic law in the last half year.32
Furthermore, some thirty states explicitly reject same-sex marriage in either statute
or their constitution. Thus, although one may expect some more states to recognize
same-sex marriage in the future, chances are that differences among states will
remain.
Although much of the debate on same-sex marriage concerns substantive
law, the topic has also spurred significant conflict of laws debates.33 That alone is
not surprising, given the differences between state laws, the lack of uniform federal
law that would trump such law, and the frequency with which Americans,
including same-sex couples, travel across state boundaries. More surprising
perhaps is how much the interest groups themselves – supporters of same-sex
marriage on the one hand, defenders of exclusive classical marriage on the other –
are focusing not just on substantive law but strongly on conflict of laws. Indeed,
both sides have stakes in conflict of laws. Mutual recognition among states would
make it unnecessary to change laws in every state to allow for same-sex marriage –
same-sex partners could travel to get married in Massachusetts and subsequently
have their marriage recognized in their home states. (Under most choice-of-laws
approaches the lex celebrationis governs the validity of marriage.)
What is fascinating in the debate is how politics reenters the conflict of laws
discussion. In Europe, politics became a part of conflict-of-laws discussions once
European choice of law became federalized (or Europeanized) and
28

New Hampshire Revised Statutes § 457:1-a.
D.C. Code § 46-401.01, as amended by the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage
Equality Amendment Act of 2009, L18-110, effective March 3, 2010
30
Proposition 8 (2008) added sec. 7.5 to Art. 1 of the State Constitution: ‘Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.’ The amendment was
held compatible with the California Constitution in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Sup Ct.
Cal. 2009), The court ruled, however, that the approximately 18,000 same-sex marriages
that took place in 2008 would remain valid. Ibid. at 119 ff. For the impact on marriages
celebrated elsewhere, see infra, text after note 42. A challenge in federal court is pending as
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, where the challengers are represented by former U.S. Solicitor
General (in the Bush administration) Theodore Olson and David Boies, famous lawyers who
had been on opposite sides in Bush v. Gore, the US Supreme Court decision that decided the
presidential election in 2000.
31
19-A Maine Revised Statutes Annotated § 650.
32
New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage Bill, New York Times, 3
December 2009, p. A1; New Jersey Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, New York Times, 8
January 2010, p. A18.
33
The most comprehensive analysis is A. KOPPELMAN, Same Sex, Different States.
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, Yale Univ. Press 2006; an excellent brief
survey is P. HAY, ‘Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States’, in:
54 Am. J. Comp. L. 257 (2006).
29
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constitutionalized (especially in the ECJ jurisprudence on the fundamental
freedoms).34 The U.S. conflict-of-laws revolution had stopped short of
federalization and constitutionalization, against the wishes of many of its proponents. Now, some of this is taking place, at the least in same-sex marriage debate,
putting politics back into the debate. Let me address each of these developments in
turn.

A.

Constitutionalization

The most intensive discussion concerns the U.S. Constitution and the question
whether it requires states to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere. The basis
for this argument is Full Faith and Credit Clause (Art. IV Sec. 1) of the U.S. Constitution:
‘Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof’.
The first sentence could require states to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere
if two conditions are met – that ‘full faith and credit’ announces a duty to recognize, and that marriage celebrations qualify as ‘public acts’ in the sense of the
Constitution. Historically, the provision was understood to relate merely to evidentiary force of state acts; what exact effects were to be given to acts of other states
would have been left to Congress, as the second clause of the provision suggests.35
Today, the clause has different relevance for choice of law and for judgments: As
regards judgments, it is understood to require states to recognize each other’s court
decisions (with few limitations). As regards choice of law, by contrast, the clause
has almost no impact under Supreme Court law.36 Traditionally, the clause was
read not to preclude states from denying recognition for marriages celebrated elsewhere, but recent scholarship has drawn this interpretation into question.).37 Lower

34

R. MICHAELS (note 17).
Most recently, D.E. ENGDAHL, ‘The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit’, in: 118 Yale
L.J. 1584 (2009); S. E. SACHS, ‘Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress’, in: 95 Va. L.
Rev. 1201 (2009), both with further references.
36
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717 (1988); Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003). The
current interpretation of the clause is summarized in R. U. WHITTEN, ‘Full Faith and Credit
for Dummies’, in: 38 Creighton L. Rev. 465 (2005).
37
E.g. L. KRAMER, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception’, in: 106 Yale L.J. 1965 (1997); cf. R. U. WHITTEN, ‘The Original
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act’, in: 32
Creighton L. Rev. 255 (1998); S. E. COX, ‘Nine Questions About Same-Sex Marriage Con35
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courts faced with the question have so far denied a duty for states to recognize
same-sex marriages celebrated abroad, at least for their own domiciliaries.38 By
contrast, recognition of marriage celebrated in foreign countries, e.g. in Canada, is
not a matter for the full faith and credit clause, so there is little doubt that the
public policy exception is available,39 although of course states remain free to
recognize foreign-nation marriages, too.40

B.

Federalization

The Constitutional issues have spurred a rarity in conflict of laws: federal legislation. Unlike most other conflict-of-laws issues that are left to the states, the recognition of same-sex marriages is an issue that has for some time engaged the federal
legislator. One reason is that substantive family law is largely a matter for state
law; the federal legislator can only define marriage insofar as it concerns federal
law. By contrast, interstate recognition of laws, judgments, and other public acts is
a matter available to the U.S. Congress under the Full Faith and Credit clause of
the U.S. Constitution, as are federal questions.
Traditionally, the definition of marriage was left to the states; whether marriages celebrated elsewhere could be recognized was a conflict-of-laws issue
largely determined by courts. Now, with all the attention, the question has become
more complicated. In response to the acceptance of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, several states have adopted either legislation or constitutional amendments explicitly refusing the recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere. In other states that recognize domestic same-sex marriages, the decision has
been made to also recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere. Frequently,
the position on the latter decision is derived directly from the domestic policy: a
state that refuses same-sex marriage domestically will, for that reason alone, deny
recognition to marriages celebrated elsewhere.41 For example, in California, marriages celebrated elsewhere before the referendum are recognized under the

flicts’, in: 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 361 (2006), 377-84. As a consequence, the Defense of
Marriage Act, discussed under B., would be unconstitutional.
38
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla., 2005).
39
Hennefeld v. Township of Montclair, 22 N.J.Tax 166 (N.J. Tax 2005); Funderburke v. New York State Dep’t of Civ. Servs., 822 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Nassau County Sup. Ct.
2006) (but see also Funderburke v. State Dept. of Civil Service, 854 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep’t
2008)); Lane v. Albanese, 2005 WL 896129 (Conn.Super.,2005).
40
Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t
2008), leave to appeal dismissed, 889 N.E.2d 496 (2008); see also Godfrey v. DiNapoli, 866
N.Y.S.2d 844 (New York Sup. Ct. 2008).
41
E.g. Opinion of the Attorney-General of Connecticut, 2005 WL 2293060
(Conn.A.G.).
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Marriage Recognition and Family Protection Act of 2009; marriages celebrated
later get all legal rights of marriage but not the status.42
However, in a number of states, differences exist. Although a New York
Court had declared the ban on same-sex marriage under New York’s own substantive law to be constitutional,43 the decision of a New York county to nonetheless
recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere has been upheld.44 Moreover,
the governor of New York in 2008 directed all state agencies to recognize marriages celebrated validly elsewhere.45 Similarly, the Council for the District of
Columbia voted to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere,46 well
before it allowed same-sex couples to marry domestically. A Texan court held that
the constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in Texas violates the federal
Constitution and thus does not prevent recognition of a same-sex marriage
celebrated in Massachusetts to provide a jurisdictional basis for divorce
proceedings.47
In response to fears that the acceptance of same-sex marriage in individual
states might effectively bind other states and the federal legislature the U.S. Congress passed, in 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).48 The act defines, for
purposes of federal law, marriage as a union between a man and a woman.49 Moreover, it leaves the question of interstate recognition of same-sex marriages and
civil unions to each individual state.50 This latter part has been much criticized,

42
California 2009 Legislative Service Ch. 625 (S.B. 54), amending Section 308 of
the Family Code.
43
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); for the fate of a recent legislative
proposal, see supra n. 33.
44
Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358 (New York Court of Appeals 2009).
45
Constitutionality of the directive under the New York State Constitution has been
upheld: directive/executive order has been challenged, and its constitutionality has been
upheld: Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y.Sup., 2008). For developments in New
York, see Arthur S. Leonard, ‘New York Recognition of Legal Status for Same-Sex
Couples: A Rapidly Developing Story’, in: 54 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 479 (2010).
46
D.C. Code § 46-405.01, as amended by the Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of
2009, L 18-9 effective July 7, 2009.
47
In re J.B. (District Court of Texas, 302nd Judicial District. 2009), 2009 WL
3316580.
48
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (Pub.L. 104-199, Sept. 21, 1996, 110 Stat.
2419).
49
I U.S.C. Sec. 7: ‘In determining the meaning of any act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies in the
United States, the word «marriage» means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word «spouse» refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife.’
50
29 U.S.C. Sec. 1738: ‘No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding
of any other State, territory, possession or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of
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although it is not clear whether it changes very much, at least as regards the
recognition of marriages themselves. If, as many think, states are free to decide
whether to recognize marriages celebrated under the U.S. Constitution, then the
provision is merely declaratory. If, on the other hand, the Full Faith and Credit
clause is read to require states to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere, as
some argue, then a statute cannot change this and would be unconstitutional and
therefore invalid.51 The bill’s sponsors’ hope was that states would feel free to
reject recognition without the need to resort to a strong public policy exception,52
though it is not clear why this changed much with regard to existing law. A more
complicated question is whether DOMA can release the states from their duty to
recognize foreign judgments that recognize same-sex marriages, given that the
duty to recognize sister-state judgments is considered all but absolute.53
A 2006 constitutional proposal, the ‘Federal Marriage Amendment,’ later
called ‘Marriage Protection Amendment’, which failed to reach the necessary
qualified majority, tried to go further, though its exact meaning was always
ambiguous.54 Its first sentence suggested a uniform definition of marriage (for
federal and state law) as a union between a man and a woman; its second sentence,
by contrast, suggested merely that no Federal or State Constitution should be read
to require same-sex marriage, apparently leaving it open for the legislature to allow
it. Although President Bush explicitly justified the proposed amendment with the
potential effect of decisions in one state on the rest of the country,55 the impact of
the amendment on the liberty of states to decide whether to recognize marriages
celebrated elsewhere was not clear.56

the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.’
51
Cf. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (U.S. Sup. Ct.
1980): ‘while Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of full faith and credit
that a State may accord to the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some
question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a
decision of this Court.’
52
House Report No. 104–664 at 10-11.
53
See the discussion in L. D. WARDLE, ‘Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage
Judgments under DOMA and the Constitution’, in: 38 Creighton L. Rev. 365 (2005).
54
For details on both legislative history and academic commentary, see Th. B.
COLBY, ‘The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism’, in: 108

Colum. L. Rev. 529 (2008).
55
G. W. Bush, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage:
Remarks by the President (Feb. 24, 2004), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html>.
56
Cf. W. SINGER, ‘Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of
Obligation’, in: 1 Stan. Civ. Rts. Civ. Liberties J. 1 (2005) 46 (‘One thing is clear however;
if adopted, this provision would allow states to refuse to recognize same sex marriages
validly performed in other jurisdictions.’) with H. WILKINSON III, ‘Gay Rights and American
Constitutionalism: What’s a Constitution For?’, in: 56 Duke L. J. 545 (2006), 553-57.
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C.

The Return of Politics

After all the developments, states remain in all likelihood still largely free to
determine whether or not to recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere. Nonetheless, the federal legislation is by no means irrelevant: it highlights the crucial element of federalism in the same-sex marriage debate. Often, federalism discussions
are confined to the vertical dimension: how much regulatory discretion is left to the
states vis-à-vis the federal government. In the same-sex marriage context, the horizontal dimension, the relation between states, comes to the fore.57 How can states
still define what should count as a marriage if parties can simply enter elsewhere
into a marriage that their home state must then recognize? On the other hand, what
is the value of same-sex marriage if it loses its effectiveness once the parties cross
state boundaries? The debate on same-sex marriage reintroduces these big political
topics into conflict-of-laws debates that had otherwise become detached and
merely technical, and it reintroduces them in very concrete ways.
It is important to see the difference between politics in the same-sex marriage debate and in governmental interest analysis. Interest analysis uses political
preferences of states as data; whether Texas should recognize a marriage celebrated in Massachusetts depends on which state cares more about this, not on the
content of the policies as such. In this vein one can argue that ‘the conflicts issues
have little to do with the pros and cons of same-sex marriage.’58 But that does not
seem to grasp the conflicts debate, which appears, on both sides, very much as an
extension of a substantive law debate. Conflict of laws is seen as a tool to promote
certain public policies parallel to their promotion in substantive law, and this is
what gets so many non-conflicts scholars interested in the debate. However,
conflicts is not merely the continuation of substantive laws by other means. The
recognition of a marriage that has been validly celebrated, even if elsewhere, is
obviously quite different from the provision of domestic procedures to get married.
The challenge for married same-sex couples coming from a change of status once
they travel among states is quite different from the challenge coming from not
being able to marry at all.
Another aspect gives the conflict-of-laws issue a partial autonomy from the
substantive law debate. Conflict of laws addresses problems and provides techniques that go beyond the pure ‘yes or no’ dichotomy in substantive law. In
conflict-of-laws decisions, a variety of issues arise beyond the mere recognition of
a status – intramarital obligations, visiting rights, adoption rights, succession, etc. –
and the considerations may be different for each one of these.59 Further, it is in the
conflict-of-laws situation that the subtle differences between the regimes of
different states that all allow same-sex unions in one way or other play a role,
57
See, most recently, J. RENSBERGER, ‘Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate’, in: B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1703 (2008).
58
S.E. COX (note 39), at 361.
59
T. WOLFF, ‘Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes’, in: 153 U.
Penn. L. Rev., 2215-50. (2005).
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because the foreign status must somehow be made to fit into the domestic legal
landscape.60
The potential of conflict of laws is twofold, as the same-sex marriage debate
demonstrates: First, it brings to the fore the conflict between different conceptions
as an actual conflict (of laws), not a mere technical question without real political
relevance. Second, it responds to the conflict in a way catered to the specifics of
the case, not on an abstract level.61 This potential of conflict of laws as an alternative site for political debate is not confined to same-sex marriage. For example,
Karen Knop shows that although we ordinarily think of citizenship as public, private international law covers some of the same ground.62 In fact, conflict of laws as
private citizenship has particular value in a post-9/11 world because its treatment
of enemy aliens, illegal immigrants, and members of religious immigrant groups
and other minorities offers us examples of already-existing cosmopolitanism
within the common law. Rather than deny the political relevance of these contexts,
then, conflict of laws has a more differentiated way of dealing with them. As
Marianne Constable points out from the perspective of political theory, conflict of
laws can be thought of as the discipline that deals with ‘meaningful cross-state
politics and actions by non-simply-state players.’63

III. The Return of Theory: Interdisciplinarity
Once it is clear (again) that conflict of laws is not ‘merely’ about pure technicalities, the need for a proper theory becomes acute again. Indeed, a second development can be seen in new attempts to theorize conflict of laws, in particular from an
interdisciplinary perspective. In 1987, Richard Posner named ‘the destruction of
certainty in the field of conflict-of-laws’ as a prime example of the inadequacy of
lawyerly as opposed to interdisciplinary reform.64 More recently, the general trend
towards interdisciplinarity has begun to spread to conflict of laws – first from the
social sciences, more recently also from the humanities and critical theory.65 Some
60
H. Y. LEVIN, ‘Resolving Interstate Conflicts Over Marriage, Marriage-Like, and
Marriage-Lite Relationships’ (2009), available at <http://works.bepress.com/hillel_levin/>.
61
See K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts: A
Conflict of Laws Approach’ (2009) at 10, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413189>.
62
K. KNOP, ‘Citizenship, Public and Private’, in: 71/3 Law & Cont. Probs. 309
(Summer 2008).
63
M. CONSTABLE, ‘Afterword: Conflicts as a Law of Laws?’, in: 71/3 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 343 (Summer 2008).
64
R. POSNER, ‘The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987’, in:
Harv. L. Rev. 100 (1987) 761, 769-70; see also his fundamental criticism in Kaczmarek v.
Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987).
65
See especially Law & Contemp Probs 71/3 (Summer 2008): ‘Transdisciplinary
Conflicts’ (K. KNOP, R. MICHAELS & A. RILES, special eds.) (note *).
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of this interdisciplinary work comes from conflict-of-laws scholars who, disappointed by traditional methods, or perhaps in search of new things to say, import
approaches from outside the law. Some such work comes from scholars from other
disciplines altogether – economics, political science, anthropology – who view
conflict of laws as a fruitful field for experimentation. Sometimes, these interdisciplinary approaches amount to little more than reformulations of traditional
approaches in conflict of laws. Sometimes, however, the new perspectives open
new potential for the discipline.

A.

Law and Economics

The greatest interdisciplinary interest comes from law and economics. For a long
time, conflict of laws was largely out of sight for economic analysis. More
recently, however, we have begun to see a small boom in interest, not only in
academic scholarship,66 but also occasionally in court decisions. One example is
the decision in Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., where Richard Posner found an
economic justification for the presumption that lex loci delicti should apply to
claims in tort law:67
For that is the place that has the greatest interest in striking a reasonable balance among safety, cost, and other factors pertinent to the
design and administration of a system of tort law. Most people
affected whether as victims or as injurers by accidents and other
injury-causing events are residents of the jurisdiction in which the
event takes place. So if law can be assumed to be generally responsive to the values and preferences of the people who live in the
community that formulated the law, the law of the place of the accident can be expected to reflect the values and preferences of the people most likely to be involved in accidents – can be expected, in
other words, to be responsive and responsible law, law that internalizes the costs and benefits of the people affected by it.
As a consequence, Mexican tort law was applied, even though the specific case
concerned only U.S. parties – an Illinois domiciliary as plaintiff, and Sheraton
Corp., a US-based corporation, as owner of the Hotel in Mexico where the plaintiff
had suffered an injury. Judge Posner’s argument that Mexico has a regulatory
66

A collection of representative articles (in two volumes) is E. O’HARA (ed.), The
Economics of Conflict of Laws, Elgar Publishing (2007); a recent survey with a comprehensive bibliography is E. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law
(2009), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499311>.
67
174 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). Discussed in S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Choice of
Law in the American Courts 1999: One More Year’, in: 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 143, 150-52.
Judge Posner has reiterated the principle announced in the case frequently, most recently in
Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2009) and in Kamelgard v. Macura, WL
3400953 at *6 (7th Cir. 2009) (where the principle was not extended to defamation).
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advantage over accidents happening in Mexico has been challenged in another
economic analysis by Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes.68 They argue that the basis
for lex loci delicti lies not in regulatory advantage but in principles of antidiscrimination in trade (and thus in economics-based principles of market competition): If a
state applied Mexican law to Mexican-owned hotels in Mexico and U.S. law to
US-owned hotels in Mexico, it would discriminate against the U.S. owner because
U.S. law is more plaintiff-friendly than Mexican law.69
Broadly speaking, three different models of law and economics scholarship
exist in conflict of laws.70 A first model extends ideas from private law, in particular private ordering and efficiency among individuals, into private international
law.71 Not surprisingly, given the starting point, there is an emphasis on party
autonomy; otherwise, choice-of-law rules should either promote private ordering or
otherwise appear as the result of hypothetical bargaining between individuals.72 A
second model, based on interest analysis, focuses on regulatory interests among
states and seeks efficient accommodation of these interests. Most solutions in this
field end up with a sophisticated version of Baxter’s comparative impairment solution.73 A third model, finally, takes the theory of regulatory competition as a starting point and assesses the interaction between conflict of laws and domestic law, in
particular the incentives for states to adapt their substantive laws in view of their
scope of application.74
All of these proposals hold potential for conflict of laws. The first two
models ultimately tend to collapse into substantive law paradigms (of private law
and international law respectively),75 which means that they challenge conflict of
laws to take seriously its basis in one or the other substantive law fields, even
68
J. L. GOLDSMITH & A. O. SYKES, ‘Lex loci delictus and global economic welfare:
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp.’, in: 120 Harv. L. Rev. (2007) 1137.
69
More generally on the impact of WTO law on conflict of laws, see M. KRAUS, Die
Auswirkungen des Welthandelsrechts auf das Internationale Kollisionsrecht (2007).
70
R. MICHAELS, ‘Economics of Law as Choice of Law’, in: 71 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 73, 77-87; for application to choice of law in torts, R. MICHAELS, ‘Two Economists
Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law – Cross-Border Torts as
Example’, in: J. BASEDOW & T. KONO (eds.), An Economic Analysis of Private International
Law (2006) 143.
71
E. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, ‘From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law’, in:
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151 (2000); see also M. J. WHINCOP & M. KEYES, Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws (2001) (a book by two Australian scholars but with impact in
the United States).
72
E. O’HARA & L. E. RIBSTEIN, The Law Market (2009).
73
J. TRACHTMAN, The Economic Structure of International Law (2008).
74
See, e.g., M. J. WHINCOP & M. KEYES (note 71); E. O’HARA & L.E. RIBSTEIN (note
71); J. P. TRACHTMAN, ‘Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction’, in: 42 Va. J. Int’l
L. 1 (2001); J. P. TRACHTMAN, ‘Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility’, in: 26 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 975 (1994).
75
R. MICHAELS (note 70), at 94-101; see also K. ROOSEVELT, Conflict of Laws
(2010) 39-41.
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though it is unlikely they will lead to fundamentally new approaches or even
theories. The third model provides considerations that are altogether absent from
traditional conflict of laws thinking and that may prove fruitful ideas.

B.

Political Science

Economics is not the only social science with a newly found interest in conflict of
laws; another is political science. For a long time, that was not the case. Lea Brilmayer argued earlier that the application of foreign law had to be justified in
considerations of rights and fairness, and that the application of a certain law to a
person had to be justified on political grounds,76 but she has moved her scholarly
interest to other areas. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s earlier work on international law
and international relations incorporated conflict of laws because it has a place for
private actors and thus for private international law;77 but conflict of laws no longer
plays a role in her recent work.78 Most political theory still ignores conflict of laws;
even analyses in international relations that address prescriptive jurisdiction and
sovereignty rarely deal with matters of conflict of laws. However, this may be
changing. Political science analyses draw attention to the connection between
private international law and global governance in a way that is largely ignored by
insider experts. At the same time, political science and political theory may
(re)insert a political perspective into a discipline that has long been defined by
technicalities. These, ironically, are based on concepts like governmental interests
that once carried enormous political significance.
To begin with empirics, one fashionable topic in political science in the
United States is the determination of factors that impact judicial decisions. Political
scientists are often skeptical that legal doctrine has any role to play, let alone a
decisive one, in how judges rule on cases. Earlier empirical studies came to the
same conclusion for choice of law and thereby fed into the general criticism of
conflict of laws as a field with too many methodological approaches that ultimately
leave too much discretion to judges to decide cases as they see fit.79 By contrast, a
recent analysis by Chris Whytock on choice of law in international transactions,
76

An exception is L. BRILMAYER, ‘Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law’, in: 98 Yale
L.J. 1277 (1989).
77
E.g. A.-M. SLAUGHTER, ‘Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law’, in: 10 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 717 (1995) 730 (‘The choice of law governing individuals and groups in transnational society is an important factor shaping the
predictability and facility of transnational social relations.’)
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A.-M. SLAUGHTER, A New World Order (2004).
79
M. E. SOLIMINE, ‘An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law’, in: 24
Ga. L. Rev. 49 (1989); P. J. BORCHERS, ‘The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical
Study’, in: 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 357 (1992); S. E. THIEL, ‘Choice of Law and the HomeCourt Advantage: Evidence’, in: 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 291 (2000), 305; see also S.C.
SYMEONIDES (note 10), and the critique by H. Y. LEVIN, ‘What Do We Really Know About
the American Choice-of-Law Revolution?’, in: 60 Stan. L. Rev. 247 (2007).
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using more sophisticated regression analysis than some earlier studies, reaches the
result that methods do have an impact on the outcome of cases.80 This result is
relevant for conflict of laws not only because it suggests that conflict of laws
doctrine is practically relevant; more importantly, it reenters conflict of laws
among the disciplines relevant for global governance, a point that Whytock makes
elsewhere, too.81

C.

Legal Pluralism

A third interdisciplinary approach to conflict of laws integrates insights from legal
pluralism, a concept previously formulated mainly within anthropology.82 Paul
Schiff Berman has drawn on ideas of legal pluralism to argue for an approach to
conflict of laws that is both cosmopolitan (and thus more open than current
approaches to foreign claims to regulation) and pluralist (and thus open to the designation of non-state normative orders as applicable law).83 The cosmopolitan
component of this suggestion sounds not revolutionary for the European tradition,
but it is certainly welcome in the United States.84 The pluralist suggestion that nonstate law should be applied under a choice-of-law analysis, by contrast, might have
the potential to reinvigorate the methodological debates because some traditional
factors – governmental interests, territorial connections – are unavailable for communities that have neither governments nor territories.85
While this amounts largely to a one-way translation from pluralism to
private international laws, other scholars focus more on a mutual interaction
between both fields. Robert Wai, writing in the international business context,
lauds accounts of global legal pluralism for their analyses of the growth of multiple
normative orders and their recognition of inter-legality, meaning the
superimposition, interpenetration, and mixture of different legal spaces in both

80

C. A. WHYTOCK, ‘Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action’, in: 84
N.Y.U. L. Rev. (2009) 719.
81
C. A. WHYTOCK, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’, in: 84 Tulane Law
Review (forthcoming 2009). See also T. PUTNAM, ‘Courts Without Borders: Domestic
Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere’, in: 63 International Organization 459-490 (2009).
82
See also R. MICHAELS, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, in: 5 Annual Review of Law 243
(2009).
83
See P. S. BERMAN, ‘Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era’, in: 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819 (2005); P. S.
BERMAN, ‘The New Legal Pluralism’, in: 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 225
(2009), 234-36.
84
See N. HATZIMIHAIL, ‘On Mapping the Conceptual Battlefield of Private International Law’, in: 13 Hague Y.B. Int’l L. 57 (2000).
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mind and action.86 However, he argues that while these accounts serve as an
important corrective to a doctrinal focus on state norms, they overemphasize nonstate normative orders, for example, insisting on a purely non-state lex mercatoria
unrecognizable to legal practitioners. For Wai, they also miss the full extent of
their own conception of inter-legality. He proposes instead ‘transnational private
law’ as a frame of reference that adds private international law to private law,
thereby reminding us of private law’s concern with relationships among plural and
transnational normative orders, both state and non-state.
As a last example, Annelise Riles shows how contemporary anthropological
insights into the character of cultural difference and cultural fragmentation can
reframe conflict-of-laws analysis in productive ways.87 Taking up the example of
the treatment of Native American sovereignty in U.S. courts, she argues that a
theory of conflict of laws as a discipline devoted to addressing the problem of
cultural conflict is more doctrinally illuminating than the mainstream view of
conflict of laws as political conflict. Rethinking these cultural conflicts, examining
them through the prism of recent anthropological insights about culture as a
problem of empathetic description and collaborative engagement with others, both
reveals the importance of conflicts as a field and draws attention to aspects of the
field’s methodology, such as the description of foreign law, that are given too little
attention in mainstream analyses.

D.

The Return of Theory

The benefits of different interdisciplinary approaches to conflict of laws can be
shown in the example discussed previously, namely same-sex marriage. Writing in
the social sciences, particularly law and economics, can simplify and bring more
order to the discussion. Thus, from a law-and-economics perspective, the proposal
has been made that the law of the place of celebration should determine all effects
as between the parties, but that states remain free to define the third-party effect of
marriages celebrated elsewhere.88 Law-and-economics authors freely admit that
this is more a perspective than a solution, leaving specific questions open.89 By
contrast, writings from the humanities and critical theory help add necessary
complexity, by demonstrating the social meaning of legal recognition. For
example, Brenda Cossman demonstrates how recognition of same-sex marriage
takes place not only through court decisions but also, more publicly, in
announcements in the New York Times. She also shows how the invocation of
86
R. WAI, ‘The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law’, in: 71/3 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 107 (Summer 2008).
87
A. RILES, ‘Cultural Conflicts’, in: 71/3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273 (Summer
2008).
88
F. BUCKLEY & L. E. RIBSTEIN, ‘Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars’, in: U. Ill. L.
Rev. 561 (2001).
89
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public policy against same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere paradoxically
reinforces the existence of gay and lesbian marriage as a political problem, and
recognizes the validity of a same-sex marriage, even if celebrated elsewhere.90 In
this sense, the very proceedings in which courts decide whether to recognize a
same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere is already an act of recognition insofar as
the proceedings must recognize publicly, for purposes of the proceedings, the
existence of this very marriage, even if they ultimately deny legal recognition. We
see a similar occurrence in the Texan decision reported above: if a marriage
celebrated in Massachusetts is recognized for the purpose of allowing divorce, its
effect is paradoxical: the marriage in question is at the same time recognized as
valid and destroyed through the divorce.91 This kind of paradoxical (and fruitful)
engagement with the issues of same-sex marriage would be hard to conceive in
domestic law, yet it also requires theoretical analysis to become visible.
We see, thus, two promises of the new interdisciplinarity in conflict of laws.
One use of interdisciplinarity currently in vogue seeks to directly translate insights
from other disciplines into substantive legal rules. Even though the rules that result
from such translations often merely resemble what already existed before the doctrine, the interdisciplinary lens provides an additional perspective on what exists.
Unfortunately, interdisciplinary suggestions for legal rules rarely achieve the
complexity and specificity needed for adequate legal solutions; this is nowhere
more true than in conflict of laws. This seems to be true especially for the United
States: recent economic analysis of choice of law pursued by European and
Japanese scholars is more closely tied to doctrine.92 But the return to simple models
may be beneficial for a discipline mired in complexities.
Another use of interdisciplinarity can be both to highlight the specific sensitivities and rationalities existing within conflict of laws and to develop a new,
richer and more theoretical, view of the field. Thus, political-science analyses draw
attention to the connection between private international law and global governance in a way that is largely ignored by insider experts. The insights of legal plu-

90
B. COSSMAN, ‘Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex Marriages
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ralism can help develop an understanding of the sensitivities necessary to deal with
the global legal pluralism that characterizes the situation of law in today’s world.

IV. Conclusion: Ready for a New Restatement?
What does all of this mean for a new Restatement? A Restatement would have to
consist of some type of rules, and this presents a problem in a discipline that has, at
least in the United States, become deeply suspicious of rules. Admittedly, the
emphasis on politics has not prevented a certain return to legal rules in choice of
law.93 Courts in New York attempted to formulate their approach to determining
the law applicable for guest statute conflicts (and later loss-allocating rules more
generally) in what has become known as the Neumeier rules, but these rules have
not gained many fans.94 Choice of law has since been codified, arguably with more
success, in Louisiana95 and Oregon – first for contracts,96 then generally.97 This is
sometimes viewed with relief – at last, as basis for judicial decisions – but often
with suspicion. Opposition to technique is deeply engrained in U.S. post-realist
legal thinking; technique and rules are viewed as standing in opposition to politics
and theory. For example, Gary Simson, himself a highly regarded scholar of
conflict of laws, has suggested that the interstate and conflict-of-laws discussion
distracts from the real issue, which is not whether states can or cannot recognize
marriages celebrated elsewhere but if they have the right to refuse same-sex
marriage under their own law.98 This would suggest that truly political questions
93
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Book IV of the Louisiana Civil Code, La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 3515-3549; see P.
BORCHERS, ‘Louisiana’s Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical Observations Regarding
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1041 (2009).
96
J.A.R. NAFZIGER, ‘Oregon’s Conflicts Law Applicable to Contracts’, in: 3 Yb . Pr.
Int. L. (2001), 391 (republished in 38 Willamette L. Rev. 397 (2002)); S. C. SYMEONIDES,
‘Codifying Choice of Law for Contracts: The Oregon Experience’, in: 67 RabelsZ 726
(2003); S. C. SYMEONIDES, ‘Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts:
An Exegesis’, in: 44 Willamette L. Rev. 205-52 (2007).
97
Chapter 451, 2009 Laws (signed into law June 23, 2009; effective January 1,
2010).
98
G. J. SIMSON, ‘Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate’,
in: 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 313 (2006).

Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 11 (2009)

29

Ralf Michaels
are matters for substantive law and for the constitution, but not for the technicalities of conflict of laws. And indeed, the heritage from legal realism seems to suggest an insurmountable difference between politics and theory on the one hand,
doctrine on the other.
Symeonides has suggested that one way to deal with this problem is to formulate a technique that faces no opposition from politics or theory because it mirrors their outcome. He suggests using empirical surveys of outcomes to conflict-oflaws cases99 as the basis for the formulation of new and better rules.100 He has
applied this approach for rather general rules on issues of loss-distribution101 and
conduct regulation102 as well as cross-border torts103 and, more specifically, for
product liability.104 Now, he suggests using the experiences gained in the process as
a basis for a third Restatement of Conflict of Laws, though one limited to the law
of obligations.105
The return to rules and thus an openly technical approach to choice of law
may serve as a welcome antidote to the exaggeratedly open-ended approaches
favored in the conflicts revolution. The revolution in the United States was directed
against, and thus spurred by, the particular choice-of-law rules formulated in the
First Restatement,106 leaving open the possibility that better rules than the ones
formulated in the First Restatement are possible.107 Nonetheless, the fundamental
opposition to rules may stymie the development of new, better rules as well. The
attempt to ground new rules on surveys of case outcomes, with little attention to
either doctrine or theory, may be insufficient. The conflict of laws revolution
combined its antiformalism with the rise of politics and theory, but this need not
mean that those categories are incompatible. The new developments discussed
above may be able to provide substance for projects towards a new Restatement.
At the very least, they may help make the field at large interesting enough for a
new Restatement to attract the necessary support.
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